Background Guide for the
Reykjavík International Summit on the Cuban Missile Crisis

VicMUN 2026

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Letter from Crisis Director

Dear esteemed Delegates,

My name is Brooklynn Giampaolo and I am proudly serving as your Crisis Director for VicMUN 2026. I am a third-year student at UVic, studying a double major of political science and sociology, with a minor in global development studies. I have been a Model UN competitor since high school, with the majority of my experience being in Crisis Committees, and co-directed the VicMUN 2025 Crisis Committee with your now Secretary General, Brent Williams. Throughout my years of experience, my passion and love for Model UN have only grown. As I enter my final years of university, I have recognized the importance and benefits I have gained through Model UN, and I could not be more grateful for the endless number of opportunities it has provided me. I can only wish the same for delegates and hope that this committee is a memorable experience that you each take something from, whether it be the experience or the connections you will make.

This year's theme is increasingly relevant to the geopolitical shifts in the international community. If anything we've been shown how quickly relations and state interests can shift, only underscoring the dire need for strong, multilateral forums. Crisis is an excellent way to not only build your diplomatic skills, but to stimulate high-stakes, real-life scenarios that provide a better insight into how states, and their representatives act, within the international community. As you will see from the background guide, the crisis starts with high tensions between delegates, and your positioning will lead you to navigate the interests of yourself, the committees, your states or those you are aligned with. Scenarios such as have been observed throughout history and recent events. Your knowledge, skills and creativity will guide you through this committee as you rewrite a new ending to the Cold War. Although Model UN can feel nerve-racking at times, we highly value creativity and genuine efforts; your actions will not go unnoticed. Take this as a chance to push your limits and step out of your comfort zone, as historical committees with a fictional element allow for flexibility and agency. I speak on behalf of the Committee leads and Crisis Team, when I say we cannot wait to see how this conference unfolds, and what ideas or insights are brought to the committee.

Our Model UN club cannot thank you enough for your participation, as this conference could not operate without our honourable delegates. We hope you enjoy this Crisis Committee as much as we did making it, and our team will provide the best support possible throughout the conference. If there are any questions leading up to the conference, please reach out, and best of luck in your preparation!

Best regards,

Brooklynn Giampaolo
VicMUN 2026 Crisis Director

Rules of Procedure

*Note: <u>No use of any technology will be permitted during this committee</u>. All notes and documents must be created within the committee and be written on paper which will be provided the day of the committee. There will be an appropriate amount of time given to complete any documents.

Flow of Debate

Crisis is unlike traditional committees as the topics are ever-changing in accordance with the scenario at hand. Thus, multiple topics will be discussed and debated throughout the committee. The flow of debate is much faster than traditional committees, meaning delegates must be able to adapt to scenarios and debates as they are presented. Moreover, time moves differently. Committee actions affect the timeline, and will be clarified every crisis update.

The committee will begin with a roll call, where delegates will confirm their presence and voting status (present or present and voting), followed by a motion to open debate.

Delegates may motion different caucuses, or the chair can suggest a motion they look favourably upon to advance the committee. By default, the crisis operates in a constant, moderated caucus if no specific motions are presented. Delegates must vote on all procedural actions.

A majority vote is granted if the committee votes 50% + 1, unless otherwise specified.

Crisis updates may alter the flow of debate, presenting delegates with a new situation to collaborate on, discuss, resolve, and adapt to. This will be presented by the backroom team, where they will give an in-depth explanation of what actions have impacted the committee, and recent events that affect the crisis, or introduce a new problem. This may be a timed event, where delegates must solve the scenario through committee actions within a specific time frame or face consequences. If it is not a timed crisis, committee actions will solve the crisis and move the committee along.

A subsequent question period will commence after a crisis interruption to give delegates the opportunity to ask the backroom staff questions that are relevant to the recent update. This question period will be answered by the backroom staff.

The Backroom Staff will collect **notebooks** as needed, **which will be provided to delegates for this committee**.

Points

To raise a point, a delegate may raise a placard during the committee.

Point of Personal Privilege
A point raised by a delegate to address a personal concern pertaining to one's comfortability or ability to participate. For example, going to the washroom, adjusting the room temperature, distractions during the committee, and speaking volume.

Point of Inquiry
A point raised when a delegate has a question for the chair or needs further clarification. This can be logistical or procedural questions.

Point of Order
A point used by a delegate to call attention to a possible procedural mistake made by either the chair or another delegate during the committee.

*Note: Death of committee characters can occur; it is not always looked favourably upon, but under such circumstances, a delegate will be given a new character. If a delegate is fired or kicked out of the committee, the same procedure stands.

Debate Procedures

Motions

Motions are voted on in order of most to least disruption. It is the chair's responsibility to present the motions in this order. The chair may limit the number of motions to be voted on.

Motion to Open Debate
A motion to open debate at the beginning of the committee or after a break.

Motion to Adjourn/Recess
A motion for the cessation or adjournment of the committee. This will only be used to go on break or to end the committee.

Motion to Suspend Rules of Procedure
A formal request to temporarily pause formal debate. All rules of procedure will be halted for a short amount of time to allow for an optional break or informal discussion. This is determined by the chair once motioned, and will not be voted upon.

Round Robin
Typically motioned at the start of the debate, or after a break. Each delegate is allocated a small amount of speaking time, which is decided upon when motioning a round robin. This is intended to allow every delegate to introduce themselves in turn. All delegates are required to speak during their turn, but may yield their time to the chair if they choose not to fill the time.

Moderated Caucus
The primary and formal form of debate in Model UN. Delegates will motion a specific topic to be debated or discussed in the committee, the number of speakers permitted, and the speaking time. If multiple moderated debates are presented, they will be voted upon by the committee.

Unmoderated Caucus
A less formal form of debate where delegates may get up around the room to converse with each other, plan committee actions, or form blocs. Movement is limited to within the room unless special permission is given. There is no specific topic to be discussed during an unmoderated debate. Delegates will motion a total time for the unmod. During this time, the dias or director may walk around and listen in on discussions.

Gentlemans Unmod
Similar to a typical unmoderated debate, except delegates may not move around and may only discuss from their seats.

Motion to Table Debate
During a crisis committee, there are points where delegates may have multiple committee actions to discuss all at once. A motion to table committee actions sets aside specific directives that appear irrelevant to the current debate or crisis at hand.

Motion to Introduce and/or Vote on Committee Directives
Delegates will present relevant documents to the committee, such as public directives, which then be voted on by the whole of the committee. The sponsors of said document may present together or nominate an individual to read the clauses and contents of the drafted document to facilitate quick committee action. A majority vote must be one for the document to be enacted. Additionally, if permitted by the chair, a for and against discussion may commence before the voting on the directive. A select number of delegates will present a timed speech either in favour of or in rejection of the document

Motion to Enter Trial Proceedings
This motion suggests the committee try a delegate for crimes against the committee. Depending on the committee, the outcome of trials varies.

Motion to Summon Individuals
If motioned and permitted by the crisis staff, delegates may summon a non-delegate individual who is relevant to the current debate or crisis to provide the committee with additional information on a specific topic.

Motion to Extend
This motion can be used once on the unmoderated or moderated caucuses it was motioned for. The delegate who motioned for an extension must declare the duration of the extension. Extended motions may not be extended again.

Right to Reply
There is no vote on this motion. A right of Reply may be granted by the chair upon request of the delegate when another delegate has impugned their personal or national integrity during a speech. This motion must be made immediately after the speech, or shortly after, not during. If granted, the delegate will be awarded a speech to defend themselves. If the Right of Reply speech is offensive or unrelated to the attack made, it will be called to order. A Right of Reply to a Right of Reply is out of order.

Voting

*Delegates vote by raising their placard, also known as Voting by Show of Hands. If you state you are present and voting, you are obligated to vote either in favour of or against all committee actions (you cannot abstain). You cannot declare present and voting, and change it back to present. However, the vice versa does not take place.

Motion to Vote by Roll Call
A motion making a formal request to change the voting procedure to an alphabetical verbal vote. This is decided upon by the chair once motioned. If called upon, you must say yes, no, abstain or pass. If the list is visited a second time around, if you passed, you will be re-called on.

Motion to Reorder
This motion is suggested upon entering the voting procedure, and votes to reorder directives to the order the delegates specify.

Motion to Introduce and Vote on Unfriendly Amendments
This can be used to compromise with other delegates who may not be in full support of your directive. Unfriendly amendments are amendments suggested by delegates who are not the sponsors of the directive. They require signatories and a formal vote on whether the unfriendly amendments will change the directive or not.

Friendly Amendments
Amendments are friendly if they are accepted by the sponsor(s), and are adopted automatically once agreed upon. This is typically minor changes to the directive, such as slight modifications, and is an effective form of compromise.

Documents

Directives

Public Directives
Unlike traditional committees, instead of a Resolution, a crisis committee's main form of wirings are directives. They allow for efficient and direct action to be taken, which will directly influence the future of the committee

Personal/Private Directives
Sometimes known as portfolio powers, action orders, or just crisis notes. These are private actions of the delegate. They are facilitated between the delegate and the backroom. Within this, delegates can use their creativity, personal resources, power, or scheme, but only within the scope of their means. These notes are foundational for your personal crisis arc, personally advancing you and potentially the committee. Public directives should be specific and have a clear link to either the committee or the delegate's personal arc.

Joint Personal Directive
A private note signed by multiple delegates to combine resources and achieve goals outside of committee votes, leveraging individual powers for bigger actions than one delegate could manage alone. This functions like a personal directive, meaning it is private, between involved delegates and the backroom staff.

*Note, not all of a delegate's personal directives will be approved by the backroom staff, and delegates should assume the interests of their character.

Other

Communique
Communiques are used to contact entities outside of your committee to involve them in the crisis in a certain way. They are written as formal correspondence to outside actors as a way of enticing them to take action, even though they aren't under your direct control. This can be personal or the whole committee. For example, if you, as a delegate, wanted to talk to Queen Elizabeth, you may write to her through a communique in your crisis notes, and she will respond. If it is to be

issued by the committee, similar to a directive, it requires sponsors and signatories. It does not require a formal vote, but requires a majority of signatories, or approval of a dias to be issued.
- Header that says "Communique."
- Addressee, with formal title and full name if possible
- The specific action or information you want them to undertake or give you
- What you'll give in return (your offer) OR what you'll do otherwise (your threat)
- Signature(s)

Press Release

Press Releases are tools used by committees or individuals to inform "the public" in a crisis about certain facts or to spread misinformation about the ongoing crisis. This can be done by the committee or unilaterally. Often, delegates may use these to try to influence public opinion against certain plans to help their own, to encourage the public to be safe, to stop protesting, or even to get involved with the crisis somehow. If done by a delegate, it will be through a note to the backroom. If done by the committee as a standalone document, it must have sponsors, signatories, and a formal majority vote.
- Header stating that it is a Press Release
- Descriptive Headline
- Information that you want the public to have and react to
- Signature(s)

Sample Directive

Directive: M(arch) M(adness) Flip it Around W(isconsin) W(arfare) → Directives should always be titled! Creative or funny titles stand out and are noticed. Puns, memes, and acronyms are all great ways to show your creativity. *This is a public directive.*

Sponsors: Crisis Director, Wisconsin Badgers Basketball Coach → There is a maximum and minimum number of sponsors needed. Sponsors are the delegates who directly contributed to writing the directive. If there are 2 directives in the works with similar ideas, you may be asked to merge by the chair, thus merging sponsors.

Signatories: Paige Bueckers, Lebron James, Larry Bird, Michigan State Coach → There will be a minimum number of signatories needed in order to present a directive. These people did not help write the directive, but are in support of it being introduced, debated, and noted on.

1. Send undercover intelligence on other division one bracket teams, using the team's funds for the past season.
    a. Use wire-tapped jerseys for our one-half of the undercover intelligence division, so that they can infiltrate rival teams as redshirt players. Each undercover player will be provided with fake documents confirming their transfer
    b. Use META Glasses on the other half of our undercover intelligence division, where they will infiltrate rival teams' practices as scouts and record all potential plays.
    c. Instruct all undercover agents to submit a daily report of their findings, including
        i. scandalous information that can be useful in creating smear campaigns
        ii. Plays and lineups
        iii. Injuries of players and statistics
2. Use genetic mutating technology offered to us by the CIA to alter the biological makeup of our players, to increase performance, strength, agility and speed, while reducing injuries.
    a. Report success rates and possible complications to avoid detrimental effects
    b. Request an on-site CIA medical specialist to monitor our players and ensure they process proceeds safely and ethically
    c. Begin athletic testing and military basketball training to help create the most elite ball players ever.
3. Solidify sponsorship agreement with NIKE
    a. The partnership provides our team with new gear while saving the funds the school has allocated to us.
    b. The positive press from this sponsorship will lead to positive press that will better allow us to absorb negative shocks in the case of either funding or team losses, as our sponsorship gives us a more legitimate reputation.

Terms to Know

Non-Aligned Movement:
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a forum of countries that are not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc. It was founded with the view to advancing interests of developing countries in the context of Cold War confrontation. After the United Nations, it is the largest grouping of states worldwide.

ICBM, IRBM, MRBM:
Ballistic missiles are the main delivery method for nuclear weapons. On their own, they are not nuclear weapons - they can be armed with nuclear or conventional warheads, and are usually stored without being armed with warheads except for special emergencies. ICBMs are intercontinental and long-range. As the name suggests they can be fired across continents. IRBMs and MRBMs are intermediate and medium range, respectively, and their ranges usually remain within continents. IRBMs and MRBMs are those which the USSR and USA were concerned with during the Cuban Missile Crisis, as they were the ones deployed in Cuba, Europe, and Turkey, not ICBMs.

Strategic Bombers, Medium Bombers:
Bomber aircraft are another method for delivering nuclear weapons. Strategic bombers are long-range aircraft intended for "strategic" missions, usually being able to fly across continents. Examples of strategic bombers include the American B-52 and the Soviet Tu-95 "Bear." Medium bombers have shorter ranges, but are cheaper to produce, meaning more are available for missions. An example of a Medium Bomber is the Soviet Il-28. The USA did not operate Medium Bombers during the Cold War.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
The USSR is not Russia. It was made up of 15 republics, of which Russia was one. This is important for this conference as not all Soviet representatives in the committee are Russian, and the USSR was known to have different diplomatic representatives from its republics (e.g., there were three Soviet seats at the UN, the USSR's, Ukraine's, and Byelorussia's).

General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Premier of the Soviet Union:
The General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the de-facto leader of the USSR. Khrushchev occupied both this position and the premiership. The Premier of the Soviet Union was the head of government of the USSR.

Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm):
ExComm was a body of United States government officials that convened to advise President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It was composed of the regular

members of the National Security Council, along with other men whose advice the President deemed useful during the crisis.

The Backroom

The backroom is the committee operations run by the Crisis Staff. This is where the planning and unfolding of the crisis take place, which is then communicated to delegates via crisis updates or note replies.

Historical Background

<u>The Origins of the Cold War:</u>

The origins of the Cold War can be traced as far back as the 19th century rivalries between the British and Russian Empires, and the Russian Empire's rise and awareness as a Eurasian power combined with Britain's (later the USA's) rise and awareness as an Atlantic power after the Napoleonic Wars. For simplicity, however, we will start from the October Revolution of 1917.

The October revolution terrified the European states and elites as it posed a threat to their bourgeois ideals and systems of power, prompting hostility toward the Bolsheviks, who were encouraging global revolution.[1] This fear spread to the USA, where a new form of Wilsonian Liberalism was emerging (named after the American President at the time, Woodrow Wilson). Wilsonian Liberalism was based on anti-imperialism, globalism, and gradual development, and was intended to replace the system of international politics in place since Napoleon Bonaparte's defeat in 1815. The Bolsheviks posed a particular threat to the USA as they were direct contenders to this ideology, also promising a new world order based on anti-imperialism and globalism, although one created through revolution and based on Marxist rather than Liberal thought.[2]

In response to the October Revolution, the Western powers, including the USA, decided to intervene in the Russian Civil War between Bolshevik Reds and anti-Bolshevik Whites. They aimed to replace the Bolshevik government, limit the spread of Bolshevism, and secure Russia's resources. The interventionists would depart in 1925, but this experience fueled Bolshevik fears of Western intervention for the rest of the Soviet experiment's history and even today in the Russian Federation.[3]

While the USSR and West grew closer for economic and geopolitical reasons during the interwar period, this was interrupted by Britain's appeasement to Germany over Czechoslovakia in 1938 and the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, convincing both the Soviets and Western powers that the other was not to be trusted and was plotting on their destruction.[4] Nevertheless, after Germany invaded the USSR in 1941, the Soviets and Western powers became allies, but not close ones. Suspicion remained on both sides. Indeed, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill never dropped his

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[1] Martin McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949*, 5th ed. (London and New York City: Routledge, 2021), 8.
[2] David Engerman, "Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962," In *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 20-25.
[3] Benjamin Isitt, "Mutiny from Victoria to Vladivostok, December 1918," *Canadian Historical Review* 87 (2006): 4-5, 9; Alexander Hill, "Deep-rooted Russian fear of the West has fuelled Putin's invasion of Ukraine." *The Conversation*,.
<https://theconversation.com/deep-rooted-russian-fear-of-the-west-has-fuelled-putins-invasion-of-ukraine-178351>
(March 2022).
[4] Engerman, "Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War," 30-31; Hiroaki Kuromiya, *Stalin* (London and New York City: Routledge, 2013), 141.

hatred of Bolshevism, only accepting the alliance as a temporary expediency.[5] The USSR was especially suspicious of the West due to Western promises of a second front against Germany being repeatedly delayed, fueling beliefs that the West was letting the USSR bleed for its own benefit.[6] The USSR was also worried by the USA's use of nuclear weapons on Japan in 1945. While it is often debated, it is likely that the Americans intended in part to intimidate the Soviets and deter provocative Soviet actions by dropping the nuclear bombs. This instead encouraged the Soviets to develop their own nuclear weapon, which would be tested in Kazakhstan in 1949.[7]

Following World War Two, the alliance continued to make important achievements, including establishing the United Nations Organisation (UN) in 1945, but they soon began to drift apart.[8] The USSR and USA were the only two powers that expanded their power and influence after the war. As the European empires increasingly lost power and influence, the USSR and USA emerged as the two dominant global powers.[9] This encouraged a geopolitical rivalry worsened by both power's suspicions of the other and differences in their ideologies and aspirations. Both sides believed to have history on their sides, and that they would naturally become dominant over the course of time. This belief that immediate transformation was not required combined with the threat of nuclear war and fears of World War Two levels of destruction to prevent the Cold War from becoming "hot." Instead, the two powers turned to the Third World to spread their globalist ideologies and compete with each other, fueling proxy wars and establishing (often military) dictatorships out of geopolitical "necessity," yet clearly contradictory to both Liberal and Marxist ideologies.[10]

This conflict first became apparent in two theatres: Europe and Asia. In Europe, the USSR cemented its rule over Eastern Europe with socialist regimes brought into power through coups and elections, feeding worries in the West about Soviet intentions in Europe.[11] Likewise, the Marshall Plan was established by the USA for European recovery and to prevent Bolshevik revolutions. This brought Western Europe under American influence and was also observed with suspicion in Moscow. In response to American economic influence in Germany, the USSR (in)famously blockaded Berlin in 1948. While it failed to halt American influence over West German affairs, it encouraged the separation of Europe into two Blocs. This separation began to be cemented as the NATO and Warsaw military alliances were created in 1949 and 1955 respectively, and symbolically when the Berlin Wall was constructed in 1961.[12]

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[5] McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949*, 18.

[6] Kuromiya, *Stalin*, 159.

[7] Sarah Pruitt, "The Hiroshima Bombing Didn't Just End WWII—It Kick-Started the Cold War," *History*, <https://www.history.com/articles/hiroshima-nagasaki-bombing-wwii-cold-war> (December 2018).

[8] McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949*, xvi.

[9] Robert Paxton and Julie Hessler, *Europe in the Twentieth Century*, 5th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 2012), 389-390.

[10] Engerman, "Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War," 32-33.

[11] Kuromiya, *Stalin*, 180-181, 188.

[12] Peter Caldwell and Karrin Hanshew, *Germany Since 1945: Politics, Culture, and Society*, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2025), 41, 45-46, 78; Paxton and Hessler, *Europe in the Twentieth Century*, 422.

In Asia, China collapsed into civil war soon after World War Two with the Soviet-backed Chinese Communist Party (CCP) facing the American-backed Kuomintang. The CCP eventually emerged victorious. The USSR and USA also established loyal regimes in northern and southern Korea respectively, and when the socialist north invaded the capitalist south in 1950 the Americans intervened against the north under UN auspices. The Korean War ended with a stalemate following a Chinese intervention against the American-led coalition. Both the Chinese Civil War and Korean War shocked the Americans, who feared a domino effect of new socialist states that would become uncontrollable. This led to the emergence of a more activist foreign policy in the USA committed to preventing the spread of socialism globally rather than passive containment.[13] This activism, however, was not enough to stop a new pro-Soviet regime establishing itself just south of America itself. Indeed, American activism arguably helped put this socialist regime in power.

The Cold War Blocs as of 1959 with the USA's in blue and USSR's in red

The Cuban Revolution and Cuban-American Relations:
Before Fidel Castro's revolution in 1959, Cuba had frequent pro-independence revolutions dating back to the 1511 Taíno Rebellion against Spanish colonial overlords, cultivating an identity closely tied to revolution and anti-colonialism. Under Spanish rule, the sugar export industry, fueled by an influx of enslaved Africans, became dominant in Cuba especially in the late 18th century. Attracted by this lucrative trade, American investors began to take over sugar production in the late 19th century, and the American government took an interest in Cuban affairs. When the Cuban War of Independence broke out against Spanish rule in 1868, the USA

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[13] Steven Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II - International Student Edition*, 21st ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2019), 60, 63, 65, 67.

saw it as an opportunity to seize Cuba for itself. Many of the Cuban Revolutionaries, such as José Martí (who would later be Castro's role model), were suspicious of American intentions. They were especially distrustful considering the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, which announced American intentions of policing and keeping European empires out of the Western Hemisphere, seen by many as a thin veil for American imperialism. Cuban attitudes to America were nonetheless mixed, with some seeing their northern neighbour as a beacon of freedom and supporting ending Spanish colonialism through annexation by the USA.[14]

In 1898, the USA intervened in the Cuban War of Independence, quickly defeated the Spanish, occupied Cuba for four years, and established a Cuban Republic. This republic was not entirely independent, however. The USA drew up the Platt Amendment, giving them control over Cuban foreign and economic policy, the right to militarily intervene to protect American property in Cuba, and the right to develop coaling and naval stations in Cuba, including in Guantánamo Bay, which is still a point of contention in Cuban-American relations today.[15]

Contrary to hopes of the USA liberating Cuba from colonialism, the island soon became an American colony. American investment and products flooded the Cuban economy, but this did not improve the quality of life of all Cubans; only the rich landlords benefitted from the continuing export-oriented colonial economy. A sugar boom under these conditions displaced small farmers, provided negligible wages, and left many in slums while the middle-class minority prospered. As American companies and investors took control of Cuba's major industries, politics also began to be controlled by the USA to protect the interests of these companies and investors. Economic poverty and US domination combined to create another problem - corruption - as there was little other option for Cubans to enrich themselves or sometimes even survive.[16]

Eventually in 1933, Ramón Grau San Martín, a university professor, became Cuba's new president after a military revolt. Grau's new government, which was openly revolutionary and anti-imperialist, proceeded with a series of political, social, and labour reforms and abrogated the Platt Amendment much to the USA's annoyance. In private, the American ambassador to Cuba, Sumner Welles, began to encourage Fulgencio Batista, a Cuban military officer, to launch a coup. Batista did exactly that in 1934 and would remain a powerful political figure until 1959, overseeing corruption, inequality, and political repression.[17]

Batista crushed his opposition after his takeover, but eventually made peace with Cuba's Communist Party, which was encouraged by the Comintern to create alliances with bourgeois political parties in a united front against the global threat of fascism. In return for cooperation,

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[14] Aviva Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 2nd ed. (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2015), 15, 17-19.
[15] Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 20.
[16] Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 22- 24.
[17] Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 25-26.

Batista granted labour reforms and invited Communist Party members into his cabinet. In 1944, Batista stood down after losing elections, but the following government was even more corrupt and inequality rose, leading to Batista's second coup in 1952. Batista's new military government did not do anything to change Cuba, however. Overdependence on the sugar industry, subjugation to the USA, poverty, and inequality continued. What Batista did bring was political repression. Opposition movements were banned and pushed underground.[18]

In the context of Batista's repressive regime, a young Fidel Castro led the July 26th Movement in an attack on a military barracks on the 26th of July 1953 (from which the movement gained its name), beginning his path to revolution. The July 26th Movement pushed for agrarian, labour, and economic reforms based on the American constitution. Ideologically, Castro's movement was not yet Marxist, but simply nationalist and one of general redistributive social justice. After the attack on the military barracks, Castro was imprisoned and exiled to Mexico. Regrouping with ~80 revolutionaries, Castro set off on a yacht for Cuba again in 1956, but the Cuban military attacked the revolutionaries when they landed, killing most and forcing the rest into the countryside. Until 1958, the July 26th Movement was a relatively minor movement, but grew in significance as it attracted supporters from the general population, especially in the sugar-producing countryside. In 1958, the USA also decided to cut arms supplies to Batista's regime, leaving Batista without any support. Within the year, the July 26th Movement seized several cities and advanced on Havana, the capital of Cuba, as the USA desperately attempted to derail the revolution or impose an alternative preferable to the USA.[19]

In 1959, Batista was deposed and fled the country, and Castro became Cuba's new Prime Minister. The USA, accepting that Castro had overwhelming support among the Cuban people, initially attempted to encourage Castro to implement policies favourable to American investors. Castro refused to bow to American demands, however, and pushed through his promised reforms which disadvantaged American property owners in Cuba. Worried about setting a precedent if it acted weakly and pressured by investors, the American government went into opposition to Castro's government and aimed to replace him. The American government became especially worried after Cuba signed a trade deal with the USSR in 1960, and under President Dwight Eisenhower, the USA began to create an army from Cuban exiles for an invasion of Cuba. On the 17th of April 1961 this army landed at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba's southern coast, expecting significant support from the Cuban population. Instead, the invasion was decisively defeated by the Cuban military, strengthening the revolution's popularity in Cuba and abroad, but also suspicion of the domestic population by the Cuban government. Realising Cuba would need support against the USA, Castro also turned to the USSR and declared himself a Marxist-Leninist in December 1961.[20]

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[18] Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 27.
[19] Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 30-35, 55.
[20] Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 35, 58-62, 64-65.

Castro (at the podium) giving a speech in the final days of the Cuban Revolution, January 1959

<u>The Strategic Context of the Cuban Missile Crisis:</u>

As mentioned above, the USA and USSR were locked in a global competition for power, and nuclear weapons had become a key part of this. With the capability to destroy entire cities, nuclear weapons were, and still are, the most powerful weapon at a state's disposal, encouraging the US and USSR to produce them en-masse and position them in strategic positions.

Deterrence is perhaps the most important aspect of Cold War nuclear strategy. In short, deterrence is the act of discouraging other states from taking unwanted actions, particularly military actions. There are two fundamental approaches to deterrence: deterrence by denial and by punishment. Deterrence by denial seeks to deter an action by making it unlikely to succeed. For example, deploying a military force in a region under threat of invasion. In extreme cases, this approach can threaten the aggressor with catastrophic loss. Deterrence by punishment threatens severe penalties - such as nuclear escalation or economic embargoes - if an unwanted action occurs. For deterrence to succeed it must consider the level of the aggressor's motivation, the defender's clarity about what action is being deterred and what will result if that action is taken, and the aggressor being confident in the defender's will and capability to carry out threats.[21] While there are more aspects to deterrence, these are the key points. As you will see, the USA and USSR employed similar thinking in the lead-up to and during the Cuban Missile

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[21] Michael Mazarr, "Understanding Deterrence," In *NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice*, ed. Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2020), 15-16, 23-27.

Crisis, with both powers using various threats to prevent 1) an American invasion of Cuba, 2) further Soviet military deployments on Cuba, or 3) the use of nuclear weapons. Throughout the Cold War, both the USSR and USA also used nuclear weapons as their main deterrence, threatening nuclear war if aggressive actions were taken.

The closer a nuclear weapon was - by 1962 often deployed through ballistic missiles - the less time there was to respond and shoot down the missile before it struck its target, increasing the threat it posed and the strength of its ability to deter. For this reason, in 1958 the US deployed Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in the UK, followed by Jupiter IRBMs in Turkey and Italy in 1961, all three countries being NATO members. After these deployments, the US had over 100 nuclear missiles ready to fire at the USSR's and Warsaw Pact's major cities including Kyiv, Moscow, Leningrad, and Warsaw (see map below).[22] As Barton Bernstein wrote, these were "liquid-fuel IRBMs, taking hours to fire, quite inaccurate, very vulnerable, and hence only useful for a first strike, and thus provocative."[23] While the Soviets were not shocked by American missile deployments in Europe and Turkey - as any European country, Russia/the USSR had often been surrounded by enemies - it did create an imbalance in the capability of the two superpowers to wage a war against one another.[24]

During his election campaign in 1960, American President John F. Kennedy also stoked fears in the USA of a "missile gap," with the USSR supposedly leading. In reality, the USA overshot the USSR significantly, but this was not revealed to the public. The USSR likely had at most around a few dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), while the US had 170 ICBMs and, because of Kennedy's campaign, was quickly building more. The USA also had eight George Washington and Ethan Allen class ballistic missile submarines with the capability to launch 16 Polaris ballistic missiles each. The USSR did have around 700 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), but their capabilities were overexaggerated and the USSR was still lagging behind the USA significantly. Thus, there was a further incentive in the USSR to compensate for this gap by deploying missiles close to the USA.[25]

After the Bay of Pigs invasion, both Cuban and Soviet analysts were convinced the USA was preparing a larger invasion of the island, and some form of deterrence would be needed to stop this. Indeed, the USA had launched an initiative to eject Cuba from the Organisation of American States and began naval exercises in the Caribbean, which to Cubans looked like military and diplomatic preparations for war. There had also been economic embargoes imposed

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[22] Saylor Academy, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, <https://resources.saylor.org/wwwresources/archived/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Cuban-Missile-Crisis.pdf> (n.d.), 1.
[23] Barton Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (1980): 99.
[24] Sam Lagrone, "Soviet Perspective on the Cuban Missile Crisis from Nikita Khrushchev's Son." *USNI News*, <https://news.usni.org/2012/10/24/soviet-perspective-cuban-missile-crisis-nikita-khrushchevs-son> (October 2012).
[25] Saylor Academy, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2.

on Cuba, CIA sabotage and guerilla operations (*Operation Mongoose*), and assasination attempts on Castro intended to destabilise Cuba and bring a change in government, which the Soviets believed would logically also include an invasion.[26] Beyond this, the Soviets also resented what they believed to be unequal treatment by the USA, and feared China exploiting a Soviet defeat in Cuba to take leadership of the global socialist movement. Because of the perceived American threat, the USSR offered to deploy its own nuclear missiles to Cuba, with the added benefit of creating a balance in nuclear capabilities, and Cuba accepted. According to the Soviet plan, 60 ballistic missiles - which would be within range of most major American cities (see map below) - a regiment of IL-28 medium-range bomber aircraft, one squadron of MiG fighter aircraft, three regiments of helicopters with cruise missiles, four infantry regiments with tanks, and support and logistic troops would be sent to Cuba. In total, 44,000 Red Army soldiers would be deployed to Cuba.[27] The Soviet missiles deployed would be of the R-14 and R-12 variants, which were similar to Thor and Jupiter missiles as they were liquid-fueled and required eight hours to fuel and arm with warheads, thus making them only useful for a first strike and provocative as well.[28] The deployment began in July 1962 under *Operation Anadyr*, and the first missiles arrived in Cuba in September 1962.[29] The Cubans and the Soviets likely did not care or think about what the Americans would think of these deployments. Based on the botched Bay of Pigs invasion, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev believed Kennedy was weak, unintelligent, ill-prepared for crisis situations, and would easily give in to Soviet demands due to a lack of confidence.[30] The Soviets also believed that the USA would put up with the deployments just as the USSR put up with American missiles in Europe and Turkey. They did not consider that the continental USA had not faced any significant attack since the War of 1812, and the possibility of war reaching the USA would terrify the American people and government.[31] Such a large deployment of military forces from a European state in Cuba would also defy the USA's Monroe Doctrine, which was supposed to keep non-American states out of the Americas.[32] Thus, Cuba and the USSR were not prepared for the missile deployments to become a major international crisis.

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[26] Philip Brenner, "Cuba and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 22 (1990): 117-119.
[27] Sergey Radchenko and Vladislav Zubok, "Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/cuba/missile-crisis-secret-history-soviet-union-russia-ukraine-lessons> (April 2023).
[28] Brenner, "Cuba and the Cuban Missile Crisis," 125.
[29] Radchenko and Zubok, "Blundering on the Brink."
[30] Saylor Academy, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, 1-2.
[31] Lagrone, "Soviet Perspective on the Cuban Missile Crisis from Nikita Khrushchev's Son."
[32] Saylor Academy, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, 1.

The ranges of US Jupiter ballistic missiles in Turkey (right) and of Soviet IL-28 bombers (smallest circle) and R-14 and R-12 ballistic missiles in Cuba (left)

A Soviet map with instructions for deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba

The Lead-Up to the Crisis Committee:

Using transport ships normally meant for grain and cement, the Soviets transported their equipment to Cuba unnoticed for four months. Construction of missile sites began soon after the first shipments arrived, and 42,000 Soviet military personnel were present to oversee the operation. Despite *Operation Anadyr's* scale, only about 14 Cubans fully knew about the

operation.[33] The USA was aware of Soviet military deployments and while some suspected missile deployments, most believed only conventional and defensive weapons were being deployed. The USA was also reluctant to send reconnaissance missions with U-2 aircraft as there were several recent international incidents related to these planes, and the Americans did not want to risk another.[34] However, *Operation Anadyr's* impressive degree of secrecy could not last forever. On the 14th of October 1962, before any of the missile sites were ready, an American U-2 captured photos of the construction and movement of equipment. For several days, Kennedy discussed a possible response with advisors in his Executive Committee (ExComm). While several supported aerial attacks on or an invasion of Cuba, Kennedy opted for a naval blockade of Cuba. Even if the attacks were launched, as Sergey Radchenko and Vladislav Zubok argue, there was no guarantee that they would halt Soviet deployments. Kennedy's caution also came from uncertainty about whether any of the missiles were ready. If they were ready, there were fears that Soviet commanders in Cuba could fire the missiles in response to American aerial attacks. On the 22nd of October, Kennedy made the Soviet presence in Cuba public in a televised speech.[35] **This is the point of this crisis committee's divergence from history.**

In our crisis committee, instead of entering bilateral negotiations, the USA and USSR instead turn to an international summit in Reykjavík, Iceland of Soviet, American, and international ministers and representatives. It became the task of these officials to defend what they saw as their state's or organisation's interests in the international scene and (hopefully) come to an agreement on the status of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. In this summit, there are three Blocs represented, the Eastern Bloc, the Western Bloc, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). There will not only be debates between Blocs, but within as well. Some may want to negotiate, some may want to use force, some NAM members may lean toward one of the other Blocs, etc. The delegates can either use the threats of deterrence or offer "treats" to anyone they are negotiating with. The difficult part is finding a balance between these two to achieve one's aims while avoiding mutually assured destruction or complete submission. It is also important to think of the cost:benefit ratio when responding to the threats and treats from other powers and delegates. Delegates will have power over decision making as well, but this does not mean luck and the actions of other statesmen or subordinates will always work in their favour, and may have to be considered when using certain threats or treats.

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[33] Radchenko and Zubok, "Blundering on the Brink."
[34] Saylor Academy, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2, 4.
[35] Radchenko and Zubok, "Blundering on the Brink."

Red Army soldiers in Cuba "disguised" as civilians

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Committee Description and Mechanisms

For 13 days in October 1962, the world stood on the brink of nuclear war. It was the peak of the Cold War, when distrust and the existential divide between the Soviet Union and the United States defined the international order. On October 14th, Soviet ballistic missiles were discovered in Cuba that could be used against the United States. Tensions were already high as the United States had invaded Cuba the previous year and had missiles placed in Europe and Turkey poised to strike the Soviet Union.

In the world that you will enter, there was also an international summit in Reykjavík, Iceland, of political and military leaders from nations and international organizations around the world, including all three Cold War Blocs. Conveniently (or not), it took place just as the crisis erupted. With the importance of communication, the delegations decided to stay in close contact and remained in Reykjavík, Iceland, having to make decisions and negotiate from their new and, ironically, shared base of operations.

In this fast-paced crisis committee, delegates are tasked with navigating the perilous dynamics of Cold War diplomacy and strategy in order to ensure the continued existence and stability of their nations, organizations, and the world. Whether that means competition or cooperation is far from certain. The fictional aspect of this committee allows for delegates to express their utmost creativity as we deviate from history. There is an opportunity for each delegate to contribute to an alternative outcome of the Cold War. Since each Delegate will represent a person, the opportunity to exercise agency in aims of pursuing one's interests, time does not function as it does in the real world; thus, delegates must be prepared to adapt to the situation at hand promptly. Recommended for only experienced delegates, this committee will require creative problem-solving, adaptive thinking, and confidence in managing high-stakes situations.

For this committee, your Chair will hold the position of the Secretary General, and your Co-Chair the Under Secretary General.

We hope that you enjoy this committee as much as we did in creating it, and that our background guide provides the necessary information for your preparation. If there are any additional questions, contact the crisis email: vicmuncrisiscommittee@gmail.com.

If your questions are specific for your Dias, or the Backroom please address you email to one of the following individuals:

Backroom: Crisis Director, Brooklynn Giampaolo & Co-Crisis Director, Finlay Pike
Dias: Chair, Emily Goodman & Co-Chair, Evan Luksay

Issues to Keep in Mind

The points found below highlight key issues that are likely to come up during debate, and should be considered before the committee begins. While this list is not exhaustive, it is advised that delegates are aware of their character's position on these topics and/or how they may respond if they are raised in committee.

- The possible use of ballistic missiles, or nuclear sharing

- Cuban sovereignty

- Possible American invasion or Cuban-Soviet preemptive attack

- Aircraft deployments

- China and other opportunists

- The naval blockade of Cuba

- Public opinion and civil unrest

- Civilian protection

- 1960s military equipment, technology, and development

- Nuclear-armed submarines

- Propaganda and Press releases influencing the actions of actors outside of the committee

- Intelligence agencies, guerrillas, espionage, and sabotage

- Military and defence agreements

- Reconnaissance aircraft being shot down within a country's airspace

Character Overviews

Eastern Bloc Characters

Marshal Chen Yi - Minister of Foreign Affairs for the People's Republic of China

Chen Yi was a Chinese military and political figure who was a prominent member of the Chinese Communist guerilla movement since the early 1930s, including commanding communist forces in the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. He entered politics after the creation of the People's Republic of China, eventually becoming the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1958. In the 1960s, the USSR and PRC were going through a breakup as Mao Zedong considered Nikita Khrushchev to be "revisionist" and not enough of a hardliner. Thus, China pressured the USSR to not back down to American demands and keep deploying military forces to Cuba. However, a dramatic Soviet defeat could have benefitted the PRC as it could have then declared itself the true leader of global socialism and perhaps even win Cuba to its side. As he was a committed Maoist and worked in a totalitarian state, Chen Yi is unlikely to deviate from this position. He is interested in resisting any socialist surrender to the USA, yet is also interested in discrediting the USSR.

Andrei Gromyko - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Andrei Gromyko served as the primary executor of Soviet foreign policy, charged with defending the Kremlin's diplomatic cover during the buildup of arms in Cuba. He is most noted for his meeting with President Kennedy on October 18, 1962, where he formally denied the presence of offensive weaponry, asserting that Soviet assistance to Cuba was solely for defensive purposes. In the International Summit, Gromyko will likely serve as the primary voice for the Soviet Union's public defense. He will be tasked with balancing the Politburo's policy priorities with the need to keep open diplomatic pathways. Gromyko needs to cautiously oversee the international fallout of the blockade while attempting to highlight American actions regarding their own missile placements in Europe.

Anastas Mikoyan - First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Anastas Mikoyan served as the Kremlin's primary troubleshooter, often tasked with challenging diplomatic missions. Historically, Mikoyan traveled to Cuba to placate a furious Cuban leadership, which thought the Soviet Union had treated them as a pawn rather than a sovereign ally. He was responsible for preserving the alliance while enforcing the difficult concession of removing the Il-28 bombers. As a member of the International Summit, Mikoyan will likely act as the mediator between the Soviet and Cuban delegations. His goal will be to maintain the Bloc alliance and prevent a rupture, possibly by seeking security guarantees to reassure his Cuban

counterparts or by managing the "crisis within a crisis" arising from differing Soviet and Cuban objectives.

Raúl Castro - Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba

As the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, Raúl Castro was a primary architect of Cuba's survival strategy against U.S. aggression. Following the Bay of Pigs, he viewed the installation of nuclear weapons as the only tangible guarantee of Cuban sovereignty against an inevitable American invasion, and he traveled to Moscow to complete the deployment treaty. In the International Summit, Raúl represents the militant heart of the revolution. He will likely view any Soviet withdrawal as more than merely a strategic loss, but as a considerable risk to Cuban sovereignty. Consequently, Raúl will strongly oppose any concessions made without Cuban consultation and will push for a stance that focuses on Cuban survival over easing tensions between the superpowers.

Lothar Bolz - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic

Lothar Bolz was the Minister of Foreign Affairs for East Germany (GDR). Bolz viewed the crisis in the Caribbean as inextricably linked to the security of the German Democratic Republic and the status of Berlin. He feared that any Soviet capitulation to American demands in Cuba would signal weakness to the West, potentially inviting aggression against the newly fortified East German border. In the International Summit, Bolz will advocate for Bloc unity, urging the Soviet Union to stand firm against Western pressure. He will likely attempt to use the crisis to gain concessions on East Germany's recognition, arguing that a compromise in Cuba would undermine the legitimacy and stability of the socialist presence in Europe.

Anatoly Dobrynin - Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Anatoly Dobrynin served as the critical conduit between the Kremlin and the White House. Although initially uninformed by Moscow regarding the specifics of the missile deployment, which led him to mislead American officials unwittingly, he maintained professional composure to keep diplomatic lines open. Dobrynin is best known for his back-channel negotiations, including the meetings that brokered the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. At the International Summit, Dobrynin will likely work behind the scenes to help negotiate outcomes that allow both sides to de-escalate without losing face. While others posture publicly, Dobrynin's role will be to convey the seriousness of American positions back to the East Bloc and help find a realistic solution to the standoff.

Western Bloc Characters

Dean Rusk - Secretary of State for the United States of America

Dean Rusk was the Secretary of State for the United States during the Crisis and actively supported diplomatic efforts by emphasizing civility and communication between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Rusk maintained faith in the use of military action to combat communism, and kept his reservations about various events (such as the Bay of Pigs invasion) private to himself. However, Rusk was a key actor in President Kennedy's Executive Committee of the National Security Council where he used his diplomatic skills to manage potential escalatory actions. In the International Summit, Rusk will likely look to manage efforts to stop the testing, and use of, nuclear weapons. Additionally, Rusk will be a key advocate of U.S. military intervention in Vietnam.

General Maxwell Taylor – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States of America

Maxwell Taylor served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Crisis. With his military background, Taylor served as a key advisor to Kennedy through his work on Kennedy's Executive Committee of the National Security Council. Taylor advocated for air strikes against Cuba, naval quarantine of the island, and to prepare for an invasion. In the International Summit, Taylor could support efforts to keep U.S. troops off of South Vietnam's soil; however, he will likely advocate for U.S. involvement in Vietnam to prevent its collapse and aid in the fight against communist insurgents. However, especially if the conflict begins to escalate, with Taylor's military knowledge and strategic outlook, he will be a crucial advisor in shaping U.S. military responses.

Héctor Gros Espiell - Special Envoy of Organization of American States' Secretary-General

Héctor Gros Espiell was a Uruguayan lawyer and professor. Throughout his career, Espiell was a fierce advocate of humanitarian rights and saw peace to be a fundamental right for all people. Espiell will serve as Special Envoy for the OAG Secretary General in the International Summit, where he will likely advocate for multilateral, peace-based solutions to issues arising during the Crisis. Furthermore, with his legal background, it is likely that Espiell will keep a close eye on the legality of the actions of other Summit members, and may take particular issue with the U.S. if they choose to invade other nations in an unlawful manner.

<u>Alec Douglas-Home - Foreign Secretary for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</u>

Alec Douglas-Home served as the United Kingdom's Foreign Secretary during the Crisis. Douglas-Home held various ministerial roles prior to the Crisis, many of which focused on UK foreign policy. Through his role as Foreign Secretary, Douglas-Home advocated for strengthening UK-US relations; however, he believed that the UK must also prioritize retaining its nuclear deterrent. Additionally, in line with Douglas-Home's goals to promote the UK's influence and authority on the world stage, he also supported efforts to expand the nation's wealth. As a member of the International Summit, Douglas-Home could choose to support arms control efforts, so long as they do not threaten the UK's ability to hold nuclear weapons or undermine the nation's security interests. With his level-headed and confident persona, Douglas-Home will be a key voice for the promotion of the UK's economic future and continued political influence in Europe.

<u>Franz Josef Strauss - Minister of Defence for the Federal Republic of Germany</u>

Franz Josef Strauss was the Minister of Defence for Germany during the Crisis. Strauss prioritized building a relationship with the U.S. and saw West Germany's security to be dependent on NATO's collective defense system (including U.S. nuclear protection). Strauss also believed that West Germany should have shared access to nuclear weapons given that he saw nuclear deterrence to be critical to the nation's security. With this foundation, he pushed for greater German involvement in NATO nuclear planning and supported various proposals related to multilateral, nuclear sharing agreements. As a member of the International Summit, Strauss will reiterate that West Germany should not be treated as inferior to its allies. Channeling his ambitious, confident, and energetic persona, Strauss will be a key actor in the Summit's discussion on how to handle the Crisis. Strauss is also likely to face criticism for his persistent advocacy for nuclear deterrence and for his assertive stance on issues. Additionally, during this time, Strauss must contend with escalating controversy in Germany surrounding the *Der Spiegel* affair, where Strauss accused a magazine of treason.

<u>Feridun Cemal Erkin - Foreign Affairs Minister for the Republic of Turkey</u>

Feridun Cemal Erkin was a career civil servant who was Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He had to face the challenging request by the U.S. to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkish soil. Turkey was focused on the need for self-defence, and starkly against the request and the mere comparison between the Jupiter missiles and the missiles in Cuba. Erkin had to navigate negotiations with the U.S. and handle public opinions up until the official announcement that Turkey had accepted the removal of Jupiter missiles on February 17, 1963. He did his best to ensure that Turkey would still receive means of defence from the U.S.

and kept a public story that the removal of the Jupiter missiles were due to a change in defence plan and not related to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Erkin's role shows how conflict arose, even between allies, during the crisis — all due to the need for security and defence.

Non-Alligned Movement

Hermes Lima - Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister of the Federative Republic of Brazil

Hermes Lima was a Brazilian career politician.During the Cuban Missile Crisis was both the Prime Minister and Minister of FOreign Affairs of Brazil. In these roles he contributed to Brazil's role as a mediator between the U.S. and Cuba. Being a progressive Socialist himself, Hermes sought a resolution to the crisis that would ensure the removal of missiles from Cuba without sacrificing Cuban sovereignty. To end the crisis, Hermes played a crucial role in facilitating the delivery of an American message to Castro to convince him to cooperate with the removal of the missiles. This meant privately working with the U.S. and publicly supporting Cuba, all while reflecting a positive image for Brazil as a mediator and successful in maintaining world peace.

Mahmoud Fawzi - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the the United Arab Republic

Mahmoud Fawzi was an Egyptian career diplomat, having been the Ambassador to the UK and a representative to the UN before being appointed as Egypt's Minister of Foreign Affairs. Fawzi contributed to Egypt's approach of seeking a peaceful resolution between the USA, the USSR, and Cuba. Before the crisis, Egypt maintained a diplomatic relationship with Cuba, and considered U.S. attempts to remove Castro as colonial and imperialist acts. Once the missiles were discovered, Egypt was pressured by the Egyptian public to take a strong stance against Soviet deployments and the American blockade. As the crisis escalated, Egypt used the Security Council as its main vehicle to engage with the U.S. and USSR and to adopt its de-escalatory attitude. Overall, Fawzi and the foreign ministry aimed for a peaceful resolution, but one that supported Cuban sovereignty.

Manuel Tello Baurraud - Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the United Mexican States

Maneul Tello Baurraud was a Mexican career diplomat, serving in many roles including Mexico's ambassador to the League of Nations and Ambassador to the USA. During the Cuban Missile Crisis he was Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He contributed to Mexico's ambiguous approach to the Cuban Missile Crisis. While recognizing missiles in Cuba threatened peace and risked nuclear war on the continent, Mexico would not publicly back the United States. Tello's role in the crisis was difficult due to Mexico's place in foreign affairs; they sought

to find a way to support the United States in the removal of missiles from Cuba without directly opposing Castro. This was due to an effort to maintain diplomatic ties with Cuba, but also because of domestic concerns as leftist movements were causing unrest across Mexico. Mexico therefore attempted to use its diplomatic ties with Castro to come to a peaceful solution of the crisis, and opposed U.S. military action for preventing deployments.

Koča Popović - State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Koča Popović was Yugoslav military and political official who is known for serving in the Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, being a Yugoslav partisan commander during World War Two, and founding the Serbian Surrealist artistic movement. In 1953 he was appointed as State Secretary for Foreign Affairs for Yugoslavia. During the Cuban Missile crisis he was focused on maintaining diplomatic relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States, and was supportive of a peaceful solution. In a meeting months before the crisis, Popović expressed to Kennedy that Yugoslavia's top priority was independence and desired to maintain good relations with all countries. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia was still critical of both superpowers and called for an end to both the Soviet deployments and American blockade. Yugoslavia was also a champion of Third World interests, and thus supportive of Cuban sovereignty. Popović represented this position during the crisis, as Yugoslavia remained outside of direct confrontation, and maintained a "neutral" stance with a support for de-escalation.

V.K. Krishna Menon - Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General

V.K. Krishna Menon was born to a wealthy family in British India in 1896. In 1924 he left for London to study and became involved in politics and the Indian independence movement. After Indian independence he became the Indian High Commissioner in the UK, and in 1957 he became India's Union Minister for Defence. Throughout his career he was a key advocate for the Non-Aligned Movement and was involved in negotiations for many crises, including the Cyprus conflict, Suez Crisis, Korean War, and others. In October 1962, Menon lost his ministerial position in the Indian government. In our committee, he has accepted the role of UN Secretary General U Thant's special envoy to the Reykjavík Summit in order to represent U Thant's and the UN's interests. As such, Menon is interested in disarmament and deescalation. His greatest concern is avoiding a war between the superpowers, and he is willing to act as a mediator or conduit for USA-USSR negotiations. While Menon was personally somewhat sympathetic to Cuba and the UN was being pressured to end the American blockade more than Soviet military deployments, Menon's position is quite "neutral" and he is unlikely to support one side over the other.